Post by arfankj4 on Mar 9, 2024 2:34:22 GMT -5
A Paper Information Full Working Paper Text Working Paper Publication Date December Lobbying Behavior of Governmental Entities Evidence from Public Pension Accounting Rules by Abigail M. Allen and Reining Petacchi Influential studies of the effect of corporate lobbying on accounting standards tend to conclude that economic self interests motivate lobbying in the private sector. In contrast in the public sector there are significantly fewer theoretical underpinnings for the factors affecting the lobbying behavior of governmental entities.
Empirically little has been known about the extent to which governmental entities participate in the accounting standard setting process. This paper aims to fill the void by examining the Poland Mobile Number List comment letters submitted by state governments to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board s GASB pension reform project. Specifically the authors test whether opposition to proposed accounting changes is a function of expected accounting statement impact and the associated economic consequences and political implications of such changes. Results suggest that government officials lobby in their own self interests not in the interests of their constituencies.
Overall it appears that government lobbying is misaligned with public interest concerns. Furthermore user support varies across user types For example internal users public employees are more likely to oppose accounting standards reform relative to external users such as credit analysts and regular citizens. lobbying tends to be misaligned with public interest concerns. Internal users such as public employees are more likely to oppose accounting reporting reform than are external users such as credit analysts and regular citizens. However this difference is moderated in states where public employees benefits are constitutionally guaranteed.
Empirically little has been known about the extent to which governmental entities participate in the accounting standard setting process. This paper aims to fill the void by examining the Poland Mobile Number List comment letters submitted by state governments to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board s GASB pension reform project. Specifically the authors test whether opposition to proposed accounting changes is a function of expected accounting statement impact and the associated economic consequences and political implications of such changes. Results suggest that government officials lobby in their own self interests not in the interests of their constituencies.
Overall it appears that government lobbying is misaligned with public interest concerns. Furthermore user support varies across user types For example internal users public employees are more likely to oppose accounting standards reform relative to external users such as credit analysts and regular citizens. lobbying tends to be misaligned with public interest concerns. Internal users such as public employees are more likely to oppose accounting reporting reform than are external users such as credit analysts and regular citizens. However this difference is moderated in states where public employees benefits are constitutionally guaranteed.